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LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR SoME: DUE PROCESS FOR
PRISONERS IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT IN LIGHT OF TOEVS V.
REID
INTRODUCTION
Pro se prisoner Janos Toevs sued the Colorado Department of Cor-
rections and lost. Twice. Yet, the Colorado Attorney General's Office
and the United States Department of Justice requested that the three-
judge panel reconsider the judgment or rehear the case en banc.
Mr. Toevs's suit hardly seems irregular on its face. Mr. Toevs chal-
lenged his solitary confinement' on grounds that the Colorado Depart-
ment of Corrections unconstitutionally placed him in solitary confine-
ment for seven years, violating his Fifth Amendment Due Process rights.
It is similar to the other roughly 700 prisoner cases-civil suits with
prisoner plaintiffs-heard by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
each year, which comprise approximately 30% of the cases considered
by the circuit.2 Like Mr. Toevs, many of the prisoners lose at both the
trial level and the appellate level. The decision in Toevs v. Reid stands
out, though, because in the process of affirming the lower court's deci-
sion, the Tenth Circuit clarified the term "indefiniteness" used in the due
process analysis. The Toevs panel also modified the judicial deference
employed by previous panels, a change that increased the viability of
prisoners' claims. These refinements precipitated the negative reactions
1. Although there is a technical difference between "administrative segregation" and "soli-
tary confinement," courts typically use the terms interchangeably. The Tenth Circuit in Toevs refers
to the penological scheme at issue as "administrative segregation," but I have chosen to refer to the
punishment as "solitary confinement." For more information on the differences between the two
types of confinement, see Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psycho-
logical Analysis of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477,
496-97 (1997) ("Amnesty International has used the term 'solitary confinement' to cover 'all forms
of incarceration that totally remove a prisoner from inmate society. It often means that the prisoner is
visually and acoustically isolated from all other prisoners, as well as having no personal contact with
them.' Yet, this general rubric subsumes many variations. For example, some American correctional
systems now are so crowded that even prisoners in 'solitary confinement' units are double-celled
and, therefore, not isolated from one another at all. In fact, by some definitions, these prisoners are
simultaneously and paradoxically isolated and overcrowded. Similarly, even when they are single-
celled it is impossible to completely curtail communication between prisoners in solitary confine-
ment units (under all but the most extreme architectural designs). In some of these units, sensory
overload rather than sensory deprivation adversely affects prisoners whose restricted confinement in
close quarters means they cannot escape the intrusive noise or presence of others. Moreover, some of
the special units that have been most soundly condemned by mental health experts and the courts
impose a regimen known as 'small group isolation' on prisoners in which a restricted number of
them are housed together but away from everyone else." (footnote omitted)).
2. U.S. Court of Appeals-Judicial Caseload Profile, UNITED STATES COURTS
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa20l lJun.pi (last visited Feb. 10, 2012)
(dividing the sum of prisoner appeals from 2006 to 2011 by the sum of total cases filed between
2006 and 2011).
3. 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011).
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of the Colorado Attorney General's Office and the United States De-
partment of Justice and the subsequent motions for reconsideration and
rehearing en banc.
Part I of this Comment explores the history of solitary confinement
and the case law prior to Toevs. Part II explains the facts, procedural
history, and opinions from Toevs. Part III explains three reasons why the
government opposes the Tenth Circuit's decision in Toevs. Finally, this
Comment concludes by opining that the holding from Toevs should stand
and that the Tenth Circuit should deny the motions to rehear and recon-
sider the case.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Historical Background of Solitary Confinement
Solitary confinement prisons, known as supermaxes, differ from
general population prisons.4 While not every prison operates in the same
manner, characteristics of supermaxes generally include the following:
twenty-three hours a day in a small cell, limited opportunity to call or
visit with family, eating meals and recreating alone, and restriction or
denial of personal property.s Frequently, the lights remain on at all
times. 6 Although the goals of supermaxes vary from institution to institu-
tion, generally the purposes of these prisons are as follows: protecting
staff and other inmates from the most violent prisoners; normalizing gen-
eral population prisons, which allows for more vocational training and
psychological therapy; and modifying the violent inmates' behavior.
While concrete statistics are difficult to verify, one recent study estimates
8that at least 25,000 people are confined in state-run supermaxes.
These numbers are the result of a recent explosion in the use of soli-
tary confinement throughout the state and federal prison systems.9 Since
the 1980s, the use of solitary confinement and supermax prisons has
grown exponentially.10 For example, in 1984, only one supermax prison
4. See Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief
History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 443 (2006); Myra A. Sutanto, Wil-
kinson v. Austin and the Quest for a Clearly Defined Liberty Interest Standard, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1029, 1031 (2006).
5. Sutanto, supra note 4, at 1031, 1038.
6. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 214 (2005).
7. DANIEL P. MEARS, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERMAX PRISONS 4-5 (2006).
8. Id. at 4.
9. See Leena Kurki & Norval Morris, The Purposes, Practices, and Problems of Supermax
Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 385, 387-93 (2001) (explaining the growth of supermax prisons).
10. See MEARS, supra note 7, at 31 ("In 1987, over 3,000 Texas prisoners resided in [solitary
confinement] and by 2001 the total had tripled to more than 9,000."); Haney & Lynch, supra note 1,
at 491 ("Notwithstanding this long history of criticism and heightened awareness among mental
health professionals about their harmful effects, long term solitary confinement and related practices
are now being used on an increasingly widespread basis in prison systems across the United
States."). See generally Roy D. King, The Rise and Rise of Supermax: An American Solution in
[Vol. 89:2410
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existed: the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois." Two decades later,
over forty prisons across the country operate as supermax prisons.12 yet
even amidst the growth of solitary confinement in modem prisons, the
topic is not without great historical criticism.
3
American prisons began experimenting with solitary confinement as
early as the 1790s.14 Despite criticisms of the solitary confinement mod-
el-specifically, reports of insanity, suicide, and requests to be put to
death rather than live in solitary confinement-in 1826, Pennsylvania
opened the Western State Penitentiary, which held all inmates in solitary
confinement.15 The Pennsylvania model spread throughout the nineteenth
century.1 Legal criticism caught up with the practice by the turn of the
century, leading the Supreme Court to note in In Re Medley17 the inhu-
mane psychological toll imposed by solitary confinement:
A considerable number of the [solitary confinement] prisoners fell,
after even a short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition, from
which it was next to impossible to arouse them, and others became
violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those who
stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cas-
es did not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent
service to the community.
Although the federal prison system continued to operate solitary
confinement prisons throughout the twentieth century-including the
infamous United States Penitentiary at Alcatraz and the aforementioned
Manon-many states discontinued the practice and instead housed pris-
oners in general population facilities. 9 General population units afford
inmates greater privileges, social interaction with other inmates, prison
jobs, educational classes, and the ability to independently leave the cell
for recreation or group meals.20
Search of a Problem?, I PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 163 (1999) (comparing European and American
punishments schemes).
I1. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 489.
12. See MEARS, supra note 7, at 4.
13. See Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 558-67 (advocating limiting the use of solitary
confinement to prevent psychological harm and inhumane treatment); Smith, supra note 4, at 489-
94 (reviewing the negative psychological and physiological effects of solitary confinement).
14. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 483.
15. Id.
16. Id at 484; see also Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH.
U. J.L. & POL'Y 325, 328 (2006).
17. 134 U.S. 160 (1890).
18. Id. at 168.
19. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 487; Smith, supra note 3, at 442.
20. JOHN BOSTON & DANIEL E. MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL
318 (4th ed. 2010).
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In the 1980s, the rapid growth of prison general populations led to
overcrowding. 21 Prison gangs and violence followed the rampant over-
crowding.2 2 As a result, prison officials attempted to control these activi-
ties with supermax prisons.23
Cries of inhumanity sound as loudly today as they did 100 years ago
in the Supreme Court's Medley opinion. International human rights or-
ganizations and domestic groups concerned with the humane treatment
of prisoners have condemned the use of solitary confinement.24 Mental
health experts maintain prolonged solitary confinement imposes horrific
psychological burdens on inmates.25 These modem studies show inmates
experience "anxiety, panic, rage, loss of control, appetite and sleep dis-
turbances, self-mutilations, and other recurring themes and symptoms."
26
21. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491; Chase Riveland, Prison Management Trends,
1975-2025, 26 CRIME & JUST. 163, 179-80 (1999). See generally Craig Haney, Psychology and the
Limits to Prison Pain: Confronting the Coming Crisis in Eighth Amendment Law, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & L. 499 (examining the connection between psychology and penological policies within the
context of cruel and unusual punishment).
22. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491-92; Riveland, supra note 21, at 179.
23. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 491-92; Riveland, supra note 21, at 190-91; Scott
Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based Upon Alleged Gang Affiliations: A
Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83
CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1131 (1995); Andrew J. Theis, The Gang's All Here: How the Supreme Court's
Unanimous Holding in Wilkinson v. Austin Utilizes Supermax Facilities to Combat Prison Gangs
and Other Security Threats, 29 HAMLINE L. REV. 145, 148 (2006).
24. See, e.g., Elizabeth Vasiliades, Solitary Confinement and International Human Rights:
Why the U.S. Prison System Fails Global Standards, 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 98 (2005) ("While
solutions exist, the United States has carefully crafted jurisprudence and treaty reservations to pre-
vent interpretations of domestic prison practice under international standards. Numerous organiza-
tions, from Amnesty International to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, have condemned the use
of segregation techniques and the abrasive conditions in U.S. supermax prisons."); see generally
Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to the United Nations Human Rights Council, Abuse
of the Human Rights of Prisoners in the United States: Solitary Confinement (2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLUSubmission-to HRC_16thSession onSolitaryConfinem
ent.pdf; U.N. General Assembly, Interim Report ofSpecial Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. DOC. A/63/175 (July 28, 2008); The Istanbul
Statement on the Use and Effects of Solitary Confinement, 18 TORTURE 63 (2008) (addressing the
increasing use of solitary confinement and its harmful effects and created by twenty-four
international experts).
25. Grassian, supra note 16, at 354 ("The restriction of environmental stimulation and social
isolation associated with confinement in solitary are strikingly toxic to mental functioning, produc-
ing a stuporous condition associated with perceptual and cognitive impairment and affective disturb-
ances. In more severe cases, inmates so confined have developed florid delirium-a confusional
psychosis with intense agitation, fearfulness, and disorganization."); Haney & Lynch, supra note 1,
at 529-39; Jeffery L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in US.
Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 104, 107 (2010) ("The
professional organizations should acknowledge that it is not ethically defensible for health care
professionals to acquiesce silently to conditions of confinement that inflict mental harm and violate
human rights."). See generally Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects
of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and Recom-
mending What Should Change, 52 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 622 (2008)
(arguing long-term isolation causes devastating consequences on prisoners' mental health and the
lack of adequate medical and psychiatric care compounds these problems).
26. Haney & Lynch, supra note 1, at 530; accord Grassian, supra note 16, at 354; Metzner &
Fellner, supra note 25, at 104.
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In the summer of 2011, prisoners throughout California's Pelican
Bay State Prison, a supermax facility, started a hunger strike protesting
their solitary confinement and its deleterious effects. 27 The story gar-
nered national and international media attention. 28 Upwards of 6,600
inmates participated in the strike.29 In describing the Pelican Bay strike
and summarizing the use of solitary confinement in the United States,
The Guardian editorialized: "The widespread use and abuse of solitary
confinement in US prisons and jails is one of the nation's most pressing
domestic human rights issues, and also perhaps its most ignored."30
B. Due Process Case Law
Prisoners use the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as one ve-
hicle for challenging prison conditions, including prolonged or indefinite
solitary confinement.3 1 The Constitution protects citizens from depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property without the due process of law.32 fn or-
der to show a deprivation of liberty, a plaintiff must (1) possess a liberty
interest in the conditions of confinement, and (2) demonstrate the process
afford by the prison is insufficient.33 Prisoners' suits typically allege soli-
tary confinement unconstitutionally deprives them of the right to liber-
ty.34
1. Sandin v. Connor
Sandin v. Connor' describes the Supreme Court's modem jurispru-
dential approach to due process. 3 6 In Sandin, the prisoner alleged Hawai-
ian prison officials deprived him of procedural due process when refus-
ing to allow him to present witnesses during a disciplinary hearing. 37 The
disciplinary board consequently sentenced him to solitary confinement
for misconduct. 3 8 The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of the prison officials. 39 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
27. Sam Quinones, 6,600 California Prisoners Refused Meals, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 2011,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/07/6600-califomia-prisoners-refuse-meals.html.
28. lan Lovett, California Inmates Fast to Protest Isolations Cells, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2011,
at Al6; James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, A Hunger for Justice in Pelican Bay, THE GUARDIAN
(U.K.), July 25, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/jul/25/pelican-
bay-prison-hunger-strike; Solitary Confinement Should Be a Last Resort, WASH. POST, Aug. 21,
2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/solitary-confinement-should-be-a-last-
resort/2011/08/11/glQAxys 6UJstory.html.
29. Quinones, supra note 27; Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 28.
30. Ridgeway & Casella, supra note 28.
31. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 305-31.
32. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005) ("The Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek
to invoke its procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake.").
33. Id. at 221-24.
34. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 305-31.
35. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
36. See id.
37. Id. at 475.
38. Id. at 475-76.
39. Id. at 476.
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versed, holding that the prisoner's "liberty interest in remaining free
from disciplinary segregation" properly invoked the Fifth Amendment
due process clause.40
In overruling prior Supreme Court precedent and the Ninth Circuit,
the Court explained that states "may under certain circumstances create
liberty interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause," but
only in limited circumstances which "impose[] atypical and significant
hardship[s] on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison
life."41 After comparing the prisoners' immediate circumstances to Ha-
waiian "inmates inside and outside disciplinary segregation," the Court
determined that the State's actions in placing the prisoner in solitary con-
finement for thirty days did not qualify as a major disruption in his envi-
42ronment. Consequently, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and af-
firmed the district court's ruling.4 3
2. Wilkinson v. Austin
The Supreme Court next considered the issue of a liberty interest in
Wilkinson v. Austin." In Wilkinson, prisoners at the Ohio State Peniten-
tiary (OSP)-the state's only maximum-security facility-sued officials
within the Ohio Department of Corrections (ODOC), alleging violations
of their Fifth Amendment rights because "the [ODOC's] procedures for
reviewing an OSP inmate's classification do not provide the prisoner a
hearing or even access to the individual deciding the inmate's security
classification. [ODOC's] procedures for initially moving someone to the
OSP also suffer from the same lack of notice and opportunity for hear-
ing." 45 The Wilkinson Court reaffirmed the Sandin v. Conner "atypical
and significant hardship" standard.46 However, the Wilkinson Court not-
ed that since Sandin, ten years earlier, circuit courts had struggled to as-
certain the appropriate "baseline" from which to compare the presented
conditions of confinement.47 As the result, the Court identified a series of
48factors to aid in this process.
40. Id. at 476-77.
41. Id. at 484.
42. Id. at 486.
43. Id. at 487-88.
44. 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
45. Austin v. Wilkinson, 189 F. Supp. 2d 719, 731 (N.D. Ohio 2002); accord Wilkinson, 545
U.S. at 214, 218.
46. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223.
47. Id. ("In Sandin's wake the Courts of Appeals have not reached consistent conclusions for
identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular
prison system."); accord Michael Z. Goldman, Sandin v. Conner and Intraprison Confinement: Ten
Years ofConfusion and Harm in Prisoner Litigation, 45 B.C. L. REV. 423,441-42 (2004).
48. See Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24.
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First, the Court compared the conditions at OSP with other prisons
in Ohio, finding the former the most restrictive in the state. 4 9 The Court
described the conditions thusly:
Conditions at OSP are more restrictive than any other form of in-
carceration in Ohio, including conditions on its death row or in its
administrative control units. The latter are themselves a highly re-
strictive form of solitary confinement. In OSP almost every aspect of
an inmate's life is controlled and monitored. Inmates must remain in
their cells, which measure 7 by 14 feet, for 23 hours per day. A light
remains on in the cell at all times, though it is sometimes dimmed,
and an inmate who attempts to shield the light to sleep is subject to
further discipline. During the one hour per day that an inmate may
leave his cell, access is limited to one of two indoor recreation
cells.so
Next, the Court noted placement at OSP seemed indefinite because
officials offered no indication of release from these restrictive condi-
tions." Furthermore, the Court observed that placement in solitary con-
finement disqualified inmates from parole.52 The Court determined that
while "these conditions standing alone might not be sufficient to create a
liberty interest, taken together they impose an atypical and significant
hardship within the correctional context." 53 Since the conditions at OSP
exceeded the Sandin "atypical and significant hardship" standard, the
Court held the prisoners possessed a liberty interest in avoiding OSP. 54
The Court noted that while "OSP's harsh conditions may well be neces-
sary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose
both to prison officials and to other prisoners[,] . . . [t]hat necessity ...
does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty
interest." 5 In other words, while prison officials deserved deference in
their decision to place certain inmates in solitary confinement, prison
officials deserved no deference in the liberty interest determination. 6
3. Estate ofDiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections
In Estate of DiMarco v. Wyoming Department of Corrections, the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit interpreted the Wilkinson "atypi-
cal and significant" standard for the first time.58 The plaintiff, an anatom-
ical man living as a woman, sued the Wyoming Department of Correc-
49. Id. at 214; accord Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995) (comparing conditions in
question to other conditions in Hawaii).
50. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 214 (citation omitted).




55. Id (internal citation omitted).
56. See id.
57. 473 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2007).
58. Id. at 1340, 1342.
2012] 415
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tions, alleging a violation of her constitutional right to due process.so
Unaware of the plaintiffs gender identity, Wyoming sent her to a wom-
en's correctional facility.60 During the standard body cavity search at
inmate intake, prison officials discovered her anatomical identity.61 Sub-
sequently, prison officials placed her in isolation for fourteen months.6 2
Prison officials justified her placement thusly:
Placement officials nonetheless recommended that she be kept apart
from the general population for three reasons: (1) DiMarco's safety
and that of the general female inmate population, (2) her physical
condition, and (3) the need to tailor programs for her condition. [The]
warden testified at trial that a primary concern was that other inmates
might try to harm DiMarco if they discovered her physical condition.
Furthermore, questions surrounded DiMarco's identity because of
DiMarco's use of multiple, unverifiable aliases. The warden felt that
she did not know enough about DiMarco to risk placing her in the
general population. 63
After placing her in solitary confinement, prison officials reviewed
Ms. DiMarco's confinement every ninety days.
Ms. DiMarco alleged the lack of opportunity to challenge the condi-
tions of her confinement violated her due process rights, asserting that
the 438 days she spent in solitary confinement "resulted in an atypical
and significant departure from ordinary incidents of prison life, giving
rise to a state-created liberty interest that required due process protec-
tion," which the state failed to provide.65 On appeal, the court considered
"whether Wyoming had a constitutional duty to provide her an oppor-
tunity to challenge the placement and conditions of confinement under
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."66
In order to dissociate the "atypical and significant" from "the ordi-
nary incidents of prison life," the Tenth Circuit needed to determine an
"appropriate baseline comparison."67 Consequently, the panel articulated
four non-exhaustive factors to aid this analysis: "Relevant factors might
include whether (1) the segregation relates to and furthers a legitimate
penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation; (2) the conditions of
placement are extreme; (3) the placement increases the duration of con-
finement . . . ; and (4) the placement is indeterminate .... ."68 Three of




63. Id. at 1337.
64. Id. at 1342.
65. Id. at 1339.
66. Id. at 1336.
67. Id at 1341.
68. Id. at 1342.
[Vol. 89:2416
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these four DiMarco factors originated in Wilkinson.69 The DiMarco "ex-
tremeness of conditions" factor corresponds with the "conditions" factor
as described in Wilkinson.70 The DiMarco "indeterminacy" and "increas-
ing the duration of confinement" factors also correspond to factors from
Wilkinson.71
While the Wilkinson Court urged the first three factors used by the
DiMarco panel, the Supreme Court specifically ruled against the use of
the "legitimate penological interest" factor in the liberty interest determi-
72nation. Rather than consider penological interest in the first prong of
the due process analysis, the Supreme Court reserved this factor for the
second prong: sufficiency of process.73 In contrast, the DiMarco panel
considered penological interest in both prongs of the due process analy-
sis.74 This dramatic increase in judicial deference significantly impacted
the liberty interest analysis by making the existence of an individual's
rights at least partially conditioned on the impact on the government.
The Tenth Circuit then applied these factors to the facts of Ms.
DiMarco's case.76 The court found a legitimate penological interest in
Ms. DiMarco's safety and inadequate facilities in normal prison condi-
tions.77 Then, the court analyzed her conditions of confinement and de-
termined that "[s]he had access to the basic essentials of life, although
her access to certain amenities was more limited than the general popula-
69. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at
1342.
70. Compare Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223-24 ("For an inmate placed in OSP, almost all human
contact is prohibited, even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the light,
though it may be dimmed, is on for 24 hours; exercise is for I hour per day, but only in a small
indoor room."), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors might include whether ... the
conditions of placement are extreme; . . . the placement increases the duration of confinement, as it
did in Wilkinson; and , . . the placement is indeterminate .... ). Contra Appellants' Opening Brief
at 27-29, Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 11-1069 (10th Cir. May 31, 2011) (arguing that the Tenth Circuit
improperly imported Eighth Amendment and substantive due process language into a Fifth Amend-
ment analysis).
71. Compare Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 ("[Blut here there are two added components. First is
the duration. . . . [P]lacement at OSP is indefinite and, after an initial 30-day review, is reviewed just
annually. Second is that placement disqualifies an otherwise eligible inmate for parole considera-
tion."), with DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors include whether ... the placement in-
creases the duration of confinement .. . and the placement is indeterminate.").
72. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224 ("OSP's harsh conditions may well be necessary and appropri-
ate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials and to other prisoners.
That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty
interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
73. See id. at 225.
74. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342-45.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 1342-45.
77. Id. at 1342.
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tion."78 Next, the court noted that the confinement in no way impacted
the duration of Ms. DiMarco's confinement or her parole.7 9
Lastly, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the indeterminacy of Ms.
DiMarco's confinement.80 The court noted that Ms. DiMarco eventually
left prison and received periodic reviews with prison staff while con-
fined.81 These two findings supported the court's holding that Ms.
82DiMarco's confinement was definite. In essence, the court eschewed a
common definition of "indefiniteness" by basing the concept of "defi-
niteness" on periodic reviews.8 3 In sum, the court found all four factors
worked in favor of the prison officials and, thus, found no liberty interest
in Ms. DiMarco's confinement. 84 The DiMarco panel's interpretation of
the Supreme Court's rulings in Sandin and Wilkinson critically altered
Tenth Circuit law with regard to the liberty interest analysis, the first
prong of the due process determination.
4. Mathews v. Eldridge
In Mathews v. Eldridge,86 the United States Supreme Court consid-
ered the second prong in the due process analysis: the sufficiency of the
process afforded.87 Specifically, the Court decided "whether the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires that prior to the termi-
nation of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be
afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing."88 The Court noted
that due process requires "the opportunity to be heard 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner."' 89 To determine whether the govern-
ment afforded the plaintiff sufficient process when terminating his bene-
fits, the Court recognized the need to avoid setting a rigid set of rules. 90
Instead the Court offered three factors to determine process sufficiency:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
78. Id at 1343. Contra Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 70, at 27-29 (arguing that the
Tenth Circuit improperly imported Eighth Amendment and substantive due process language into a
Fifth Amendment analysis).
79. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1343.
80. Id. at 1343-44.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id.; WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1147 (1993) (defining
"indefinite" as "having no exact limits").
84. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
85. Compare Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (using a plain-meaning under-
standing of "indefinite" and rejecting penological interest in the liberty interest determination), with
DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342-44 (using a judicially-created understanding of "indefinite" based on
periodic reviews and factoring legitimate penological into the liberty interest determination).
86. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
87. Id. at 334-35.
88. Id. at 323.
89. Id. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
90. Id at 334.
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the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's inter-
est, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.91
These factors juxtapose the plaintiffs interest against the govern-
ment's burden of providing additional process. 9 2 The Mathews Court
ensured that deference to the government's interest impacted the due
process analysis at some level, but balanced this factor against other
competing interests.93 While Mathews applies to all due process cases,
solitary confinement prisoner cases present additional complexity; at
some point the plaintiff was convicted of a crime, resulting in the proper
deprivation of some liberty. 9 4 When a prisoner alleges due process viola-
tions and successfully proves a protected liberty interest, the question
becomes how to balance the prisoner's right to liberty against govern-
ment interests and what type of process is constitutionally mandated. 9 5
5. Hewitt v. Helms
In Hewitt v. Helms,9 6 the Supreme Court further developed the se-
cond prong of the due process analysis. 97 Specifically, the Court scruti-
nized the periodic review procedures employed by prisons to evaluate the
ongoing need to hold the prisoner in solitary confinement. 9 8 The plaintiff
in Hewitt, serving a life sentence in a Pennsylvania correctional facility,
sued prison officials, claiming that their actions-"confining him to ad-
ministrative segregation within the prison"-violated his due process
rights. 99
The Court evaluated the administrative reviews afforded to the
plaintiff to determine whether prison officials offered constitutionally
sufficient process.100 The Court established that while "administrative
segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement,"
91. Id. at 335 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263-71 (1970)).
92. See id
93. See id.
94. Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948) ("Lawful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the consid-
erations underlying our penal system."), abrogated on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499
U.S. 467 (1991); see also Patrick J.A. McClain, Bernard F. Sheehan & Lauren L. Butler, Substantive
Rights Retained by Prisoners, 86 GEO. L.J. 1953, 1963 (1998) ("Even though lawful imprisonment
deprives convicted prisoners of many rights, prisoners do retain certain constitutional rights.").
95. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224-229 (2005) ("Although Sandin abrogated ...
Hewitt's methodology for establishing the liberty interest, these cases remain instructive for their
discussion of the appropriate level of procedural safeguards.").
96. 459 U.S. 460 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S.
472, 483 (1995).
97. Id. at 472-74.
98. Id. at 477.
99. Id. at 462.
100. Id. at 473-77.
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prison officials must only provide "some sort of periodic review of the
confinement of [solitary confinement] inmates."'o This vague standard
afforded prison officials great deference in determining the substance of
prisoner reviews.10 2 To pass constitutional muster some form of a review
must occur, but the substance of the review is determined by prison offi-
cials and outside the purview of the judiciary.' 03
II. TOEVS V. REID
Before Toevs v. Reid, the Tenth Circuit looked particularly desolate
for plaintiff prisoners wishing to challenge their solitary confinement. 104
The extreme deference implemented by the DiMarco panel created a
tough road for prisoners to hoe just to demonstrate a liberty interest, let
alone show a due process violation. 05 Toevs v. Reid helped level the
playing field, and in the process incurred the disapproval of the Colorado
Attorney General's office.
A. Facts
The Colorado Department of Corrections (DOC) employed a pro-
gram at the Colorado State Penitentiary (CSP) called the Quality of Life
Level Program (QLLP). 0 6 The QLLP, a "stratified quality of life pro-
gram," used six levels of "privileges" to incentivize "appropriate offend-
er behavior and program compliance" and discourage anti-social behav-
ior.'07 The DOC classified levels one through three as administrative
segregation, known more commonly as solitary confinement.108
Pursuant to prison regulations, prison officials conducted periodic
reviews to determine whether the inmate's behavior warranted progres-
sion to the next level.109 Progression from one level to the next required
the inmate to meet certain behavior criteria."o After completing Level 6,
the inmate became eligible for transfer to a general population prison or
unit."' Progression through QLLP required a minimum of thirteen
months, but there was no maximum.
101. Id. at 477 n.9 (emphasis added).
102. See id.
103. See id
104. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342-44 (10th Cir. 2007)
(using a judicially-created understanding of "indefinite" based on periodic reviews and factoring
legitimate penological into the liberty interest determination).
105. See id.
106. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 753 (10th Cir. 2011)..
107. Id at 754.
108. Id.
109. Id
110. Id. at 759 ("The QLLP specifies certain prerequisites for promotion to Level 4.").
111. Id at 754.
112. Id.
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On March 4, 2002, the DOC placed inmate Janos Toevs into QLLP
after a failed escape attempt." 3 In September 2005, Mr. Toevs reached
Level 6.114 During his time in Level 6, the DOC documented negative
behavior."' As a result, the prison officials regressed him to Level 1 on
October 7, 2005.' 16
Mr. Toevs reached Level 2 on October 13, 2005 and Level 3 on
January 14, 2006 and Level 4 in October 2007.H7 "From the record ... it
is impossible to determine when [Mr. Toevs] moved from Level 4 to
Level 5 and from Level 5 to Level 6 . . . ."'18 During the course of his
"re-progression," Mr. Toevs completed numerous educational programs
and received favorable reviews for the first three levels.'l 9 However, the
"reviews never informed [him] of the reasons why he was recommended
for or denied progression." 20 Furthermore, prison officials never con-
ducted reviews for Levels 4, 5, or 6.121 The DOC justified the lack of
reviews on the fact that Levels 4 through 6 "are classified as 'close cus-
tody' rather than 'administrative segregation."'l 22 On January 31, 2009,
Mr. Toevs completed QLLP and, in March, was transferred to a general
population prison.123
B. Procedural History
In his complaint, Mr. Toevs-a pro se litigant-alleged that his
confinement in QLLP from 2005 until 2009 "deprived [him] of a liberty
interest without due process." 24 He sued his case managers and the war-
dens of CSP in their official capacities and "requested compensatory and
punitive damages and declaratory relief." 2 5 The magistrate judge who
heard the case ruled not only that the "defendants were entitled to quali-
fied immunity," but also "that the review process was constitutionally
adequate." 26 Subsequently, Mr. Toevs appealed. 27
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Supplement to Response to Petition for Rehearing at 7, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th
Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535).
116. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 754.
117. Id. at 759 ("[H]e spent twenty-one months at Level 3 (eighteen more than the minimum)
before being promoted to Level 4."); Toevs v. Reid, No. 06-cv-01620-CBS-KMT, 2010 WL
4388191, at *8 (D. Colo. Oct. 28, 2010).
118. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 760.
119. See id. at 754, 760.
120. Id. at 759.
121. Id. at 760.
122. Id.




127. Id. at 755. The district court originally dismissed his case for failure to comply with Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Toevs v. Reid, 267 F. App'x 817, 818 (10th Cir. 2008).
The Tenth Circuit later reversed and remanded. Id at 820. The appeal referenced in the above sen-
tence refers to the second appeal.
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C. Tenth Circuit Opinion
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's decision on the
basis of the defendants' qualified immunity.128 Nevertheless, the Tenth
Circuit reevaluated the question of whether the defendants' actions vio-
lated Mr. Toevs's due process rights before affirming.12 9
1. Liberty Interest
The court first analyzed whether Mr. Toevs possessed a liberty in-
terest in his confinement at CSP.1 30 In order to determine whether a liber-
ty interest existed, the court applied the four DiMarco factors. '3  The
court found the "legitimate penological interest" factor in favor of the
defendants because of Mr. Toevs's repeated escape attempts and his re-
gression in QLLP for negative behavior.1 32 The court also found the "in-
creasing the duration of confinement" factor weighed against finding a
liberty interest because Mr. Toevs was serving a life sentence without the
possibility of parole.13 3
Based on conflicting descriptions of the conditions at CSP, the court
found a material issue of fact regarding the "extremeness of conditions"
128. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 761.
129. See id. at 756-60; accord Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 (2011) ("[A] court
can often avoid ruling on the plaintiffs claim that a particular right exists. If prior case law has not
clearly settled the right, and so given officials fair notice of it, the court can simply dismiss the claim
for money damages. The court need never decide whether the plaintiff's claim, even though novel or
otherwise unsettled, in fact has merit. And indeed, our usual adjudicatory rules suggest that a court
should forbear resolving this issue. After all, a 'longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires
that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them.' In
this category of qualified immunity cases, a court can enter judgment without ever ruling on the
(perhaps difficult) constitutional claim the plaintiff has raised. Small wonder, then, that a court might
leave that issue for another day. But we have long recognized that this day may never come-that
our regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified immunity situation because it
threatens to leave standards of official conduct permanently in limbo. Consider a plausible but unset-
tied constitutional claim asserted against a government official in a suit for money damages. The
court does not resolve the claim because the official has immunity. He thus persists in the challenged
practice; he knows that he can avoid liability in any future damages action, because the law has still
not been clearly established. Another plaintiff brings suit, and another court both awards immunity
and bypasses the claim. And again, and again, and again. So the moment of decision does not arrive.
Courts fail to clarify uncertain questions, fail to address novel claims, fail to give guidance to offi-
cials about how to comply with legal requirements. Qualified immunity thus may frustrate 'the
development of constitutional precedent' and the promotion of law-abiding behavior." (citations
omitted)).
130. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756-57.
131. Id. at 756 ("[Relevant factors might include:] whether (1) the segregation relates to and
furthers a legitimate penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation; (2) the conditions of
placement are extreme; (3) the placement increases the duration of confinement . . . ; and (4) the
placement is indeterminate." (quoting Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334,
1342 (10th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
132. Id. ("Factor[] one ... work[s] against the existence of a liberty interest. The segregation in
this case certainly relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest (Mr. Toevs originally was
committed to the QLLP because of an escape attempt, and he was regressed to QLLP Level I in
September 2005 due to behavioral problems).").
133. Id. ("[Gliven that he is serving a life sentence, the placement did not increase the duration
of his confinement.").
factor.1 34 Mr. Toevs described the conditions of his confinement in great
detail, while the DOC responded by vaguely contesting his description
without providing specific evidence of the conditions.135 The court ruled
"at a minimum there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
question." 1
With two of the factors weighing definitively against Mr. Toevs and
a third factor merely in genuine dispute, the court found the fourth factor
dispositive of a liberty interest: "Placement in the QLLP is indefinite.
Although there is a minimum time to complete [it], there is no maximum
.... Mr. Toevs ... had no knowledge of any end date ... ."'3 Conse-
quently, the court concluded that Mr. Toevs established a liberty interest
in his placement in the QLLP.13 1
2. Sufficiency of Process
Having found a liberty interest, the court next analyzed whether the
prison provided Mr. Toevs sufficient process.' 3 9 The court emphasized
that "the review must be meaningful; it cannot be a sham or a pretext."1 4 0
Meaningful reviews "consider[] whether the prisoner's conduct during
the period since the most recent security review warrants reclassifica-
tion" and "whether the prisoner is eligible to move to the next level or, if
the prisoner already is at the highest level, if he or she is eligible to grad-
uate from the program."41 When the goal of solitary confinement is be-
havior modification, then a meaningful review "should provide a guide
for future behavior."1 42 Furthermore, the court explained that meaningful
reviews "provid[e] a guide for future behavior" under the Mathews fac-
tors.143 The court concluded its analysis of the law by stating:
The value of requiring an explicit advisement of progress through the
QLLP program is high, in that it promotes the ultimate goal of a be-
havior-modification program. Moreover, the administrative burden
134. Id at 756-57.
135. Id
136. Id. at 756.
137. Id. at 757.
138. Id.
139. Id
140. Id (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995); Sourbeer v. Robinson, 791 F.2d 1094, 1101
(3d Cir. 1986); McClary v. Coughlin, 87 F. Supp. 2d 205, 214 (W.D.N.Y. 2000)).
141. Id at 758.
142. Id. (citing Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 226 (2005) (noting that Ohio's requirement
of a statement of reasons "serves as a guide for future behavior"); Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 15 (1979) (noting that prisoners denied parole were told the
reason "as a guide to the inmate for his future behavior")).
143. Id. at 758-59; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) ("First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and
the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.").
2012] TOE VS V REID 423
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
on the government should be relatively low, as the QLLP already re-
quires officials to track prisoners' progress and evaluate their pro-
spects for promotion to the next level.
This list of pronouncements about how the prison could achieve a
meaningful review foreshadowed the court's decision.145
Within this framework, the court found that the "evidence indicates
that the reviews focused on appropriate factors," and would have been
considered meaningful, "but for one serious omission-the reviews nev-
er informed Mr. Toevs of the reasons why he was recommended for or
denied progression, so that he would have a guide for his future behav-
ior." 46 Consequently, the court ruled that the first three levels lacked
meaningful review.14 7 Furthermore, the court relied on the trial court's
finding that no reviews occurred between Levels 4 and 6 to determine
that the entire review process lacked meaningfulness and, thus, failed the
sufficiency of process prong.148
3. Qualified Immunity
Despite finding that prison officials violated Mr. Toevs's due pro-
cess rights, the court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's decision grant-
ing summary judgment to the defendants because they possessed quali-
fied immunity from the plaintiffs claim.14 9 Qualified immunity, an af-
firmative defense, protects government officials from claims springing
from unsettled areas of law and attaches unless the law is "clearly estab-
lished."5 o "Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established,
there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the
clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found
the law to be as the plaintiff maintains." 1 In determining whether quali-
fied immunity applies, "[t]he 'salient question . . . is whether the state of
the law [at the time of the actions] gave respondents fair warning that
their [conduct] was unconstitutional."'l 5 2 The Tenth Circuit found that
the law governing meaningfulness and sufficiency of process was unset-
tled, thus entitling the defendants to qualified immunity. 153
144. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759.
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 760.
148. Id
149. Id. at 761.
150. Id. at 760.
151. Id. (quoting Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139,1151 (10th Cir. 2006)).
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III. ANALYSIS
Toevs v. Reid impacts due process law in the Tenth Circuit in three
fundamental ways. First, Toevs clarified the word "indefinite," comport-
ing the circuit's use of the word with the common usage. Second, Toevs
impacted other prisons operating within the circuit other than the Colora-
do State Penitentiary, vastly increasing the importance of the case. Third,
Toevs lessened the judicial deference afforded prison officials in the de-
termination of a liberty interest. All three outcomes support prisoner
Fifth Amendment claims. Thus, the Colorado Attorney General's Office
and the United States Department of Justice opposed the Toevs holding
and appealed the decision, despite winning the case.
A. A Clarified Interpretation oflndefiniteness
In evaluating Mr. Toevs's liberty interest, the Tenth Circuit found
the confinement to be indefinite because it had no set end date.15 4 The
court noted that while "there is a minimum time to complete [QLLP],
there is no maximum, and there is no restriction on how many times a
prisoner may be regressed to lower levels."'5 5 Furthermore, the court
found that "[w]hen Mr. Toevs was placed in the QLLP, he had no
knowledge of any end date, and as it turned out, he was in the QLLP for
nearly seven years."' 56 Based on these facts, the Tenth Circuit deemed
Mr. Toevs's confinement indefinite. 57
The Toevs court employed a plain-meaning definition of "indefi-
nite" in reaching this conclusion.' 58 The panel's use of the word adheres
to the standard dictionary definition of the word "indefinite," which is
"not precise" and "having no exact limits." 59 In other words, periodic
reviews and the existence of a step-down program do not make a place-
ment definite.160
A plain-meaning application of "indefiniteness" seemingly conflicts
with the Tenth Circuit's application of the word "indefiniteness" in
DiMarco.161 There, the Tenth Circuit found "definiteness" because of
periodic reviews.162 However, the duration of overall sentence distin-
guishes DiMarco from Toevs.'63 Ms. DiMarco served fourteen months of





159. WEBSTER'S THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 83, at 1147.
160. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757; accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (find-
ing OSP's prisoners possessed liberty interest despite prison officials providing annual reviews).
161. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1343-44 (10th Cir. 2007).
162. Id.
163. Compare DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344 (noting Ms. DiMarco's stay in solitary confinement
was fourteen months), with Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756 (noting Mr. Toev's stay in solitary confinement
was nearly seven years).
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a two-year sentence in solitary confinement.16 Mr. Toevs served seven
years of a life sentence in the same conditions.'6 Ms. DiMarco knew that
her solitary confinement would end no more than two years after it began
based on the length of her sentence.166 Mr. Toevs could have legitimately
believed that he might spend the rest of his life sentence in solitary con-
finement. 167 Another way to understand the difference between Toevs
and DiMarco is the duration of the actual time spent in solitary confine-
ment. Mr. Toevs spent seven years in solitary confinement, while Ms.
DiMarco spent fourteen months.16 1
Indeed, the Tenth Circuit and districts courts within the circuit have
struggled with how to analyze duration of time spent in solitary confine-
ment and indefiniteness. 16 9 The Toevs panel considered the duration of
Mr. Toevs's time spent in solitary confinement in its discussion of "in-
definiteness," and concluded the "indefinite placement ... in the type of
conditions he alleged, established a protected liberty interest."170 Com-
bining duration of time in solitary confinement with indefiniteness fits
with the rulings of the sister circuits because many circuits find a liberty
interest on duration and conditions alone.17 1 Although difficult to tease
164. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
165. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756.
166. See DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
167. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756.
168. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 756; DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1344.
169. See Payne v. Friel, 266 F. App'x 724, 728 (10th Cir. 2008) ("Nonetheless, the district
court dismissed his due process claim at the pleading stage without inquiring into whether the dura-
tion of his confinement in segregation alone constituted an atypical and significant hardship. This
was error."); Trujillo v. Williams, 465 F.3d 1210, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Where, as here, the pris-
oner is subjected to a lengthy period of segregation, the duration of that confinement may itself be
atypical and significant."); Smith v. Ortiz, No. 05-1211, 2006 WL 620871, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 14,
2006) ("The duration of confinement may itself be atypical and significant."); Gaines v. Stenseng,
292 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine whether the 75-day duration of
plaintiffs confinement in segregation was itself atypical and significant); cf Jordan v. Fed. Bureau
of Prisons, 191 F. App'x 639, 652 (10th Cir. 2006) ("Clearly, we do not condone a murder investiga-
tion which takes almost five years, during which time an inmate is subjected to conditions which are
atypical or pose a significant hardship. However, in this case, we have already determined the condi-
tions or restrictions Mr. Jordan encountered did not pose the requisite Sandin atypical or significant
hardship. Even if we considered the five-year duration of the confinement alone, this court has held
certain prison actions which might impinge on an inmate's constitutional rights may be valid if they
are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."); Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-
cv-02467-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL 5464294, at *5 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010) ("Finally, plaintiffs argue
that the magistrate judge did not properly consider the length of time they had been incarcerated at
ADX as relevant to the extremity of the conditions there, in part because she improperly allowed this
fact to be overridden by defendant's legitimate penological interest. However, in considering wheth-
er the duration of plaintiffs' confinement made such confinement extreme, the magistrate judge also
noted that plaintiffs had been incarcerated at ADX for approximately the same length of time as the
inmates in Jordan and Georgacarakos." (citations omitted)); Georgacarakos v. Wiley, No. 07-cv-
01712-MSK-MEH, 2010 WL 1291833, at *13 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2010) (finding indefinite solitary
confinement not rising to level of a liberty interest); Rezaq v. Nalley, 07-CV-02483-LTB-KLM,
2008 WL 5172363, at *9 (D. Colo. Dec. 10, 2008).
170. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757 (emphasis added).
171. Marion v. Columbia Corr. Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 698 (7th Cir. 2009); Harden-Bey v. Rutter,
524 F.3d 789, 793 (6th Cir. 2008); Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App'x 647, 648 (8th Cir. 2008)
("[Plaintiff|-who is serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, imposed in 1981-has
continuously spent almost nine years in ad seg confinement in Arkansas, plus more than three years
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out precisely what swayed the panel to differentiate Toevs and DiMarco,
these two panel decisions accord with one another on the issue of indefi-
niteness.
The Toevs court's plain-meaning application of "indefiniteness"
makes the liberty interest determination not only more common sense,
but also less subjective, which makes the process fairer. 17 2 Plain-meaning
indefiniteness removes all subjectivity from the analysis: either the pris-
oner knew of the release date from solitary confinement or the confine-
ment is indefinite. 173 In this sense, solitary confinement intended for be-
havior modification becomes more like disciplinary segregation, which
holds prisoners for a set period of time.174 By refocusing the analysis
away from periodic reviews, the Tenth Circuit makes the finding of in-
definiteness clearer.175
B. Impact on the Federal Prison System in the Tenth Circuit
The Toevs ruling affects not only the Colorado DOC, but also the
federal prisons located within the Tenth Circuit.17 6 In the six states com-
prising the Tenth Circuit'77 the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) operates
nine facilities, with six in Colorado alone.'7 8 Those nine facilities house
approximately 6,200 inmates. 79 This population includes the most nota-
ble inmates in the entire BOP system: inmates housed in the United
in ad seg in Utah, and we agree with the district court that this constitutes an atypical and significant
hardship, considering the particular restrictions imposed on [PlaintiffJ in relation to his ad seg status
during this time, and thus he had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause."); lqbal v.
Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 161 (2d Cir. 2007) ("Numerous cases in this Circuit have discussed the 'atypi-
cal and significant hardship' prong of Sandin. Relevant factors include both the conditions of segre-
gation and its duration."), rev d and remanded sub nom. Ashcroft v. lqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009);
Stephens v. Cottey, 145 F. App'x 179, 181 (7th Cir. 2005) ("In determining whether prison condi-
tions meet [the Sandin] standard, courts place a premium on the duration of the deprivation.");
Sealey v. Giltner, 197 F.3d 578, 586 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Both the conditions and their duration must be
considered since especially harsh conditions endured for a brief interval and somewhat harsh condi-
tions endured for a prolonged interval might both be atypical." (citation omitted)).
172. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
173. See id.
174. See BOSTON & MANVILLE, supra note 20, at 169.
175. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
176. See id. at 760; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at
4, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535) ("The Toevs published opinion is not
expressly limited to DOC inmates in the QLLP program but is seemingly applicable to any inmate
held in any penal institution anywhere within the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit, including the
Federal Supermax facility in Florence, Colorado, the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth and
innumerable other Federal and state penitentiaries across the six states."); Brief of the United States
as Anicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc at 2, Toevs v. Reid,
646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-1535) ('The federal Government has a strong interest in the
correct disposition of this matter. . . . [T]he federal Government is the custodian of numerous prison-
ers within this Circuit, many of whom are subject to restrictive conditions of confinement.").
177. Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico.
178. Weekly Population Report, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/weekly report.jsp (last updated Feb. 12, 2012).
179. See id.
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States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum Facility, known more
commonly as the ADX. 80
Opened in 1994 outside of Florence, Colorado, the ADX "houses
offenders requiring the tightest controls."' 1 As the only administrative
maximum facility in the BOP, the ADX is "the only [federal] prison spe-
cifically designed to keep every occupant in near-total solitary confine-
ment." 82 Like the most restrictive levels of QLLP at CSP, the ADX in-
mates spend twenty-three hours per day in lockup, eat alone, and recreate
alone.' 83 One inmate described the conditions as "total sensory depriva-
tion,"l84 while a former ADX warden described the conditions as "a
cleaner version of hell."' 85 Some of the 442 inmates housed in ADX'86
include Theodore Kaczynski,187 Zacarias Moussaoui, Terry Nichols,189
Richard Reid,1 90 and Eric Rudolph.191
Toevs implicates these inmates in two very significant ways. First,
the finding of a liberty interest at CSP could bolster future prisoner litiga-
tion challenging the conditions of confinement at the ADX.1 92 Remarka-
bly, no Colorado district court has ever found a liberty interest based on
placement at the ADX. 19 3 Both the ADX and CSP operate as supermaxes
with substantially similar conditions of confinement.'94 A liberty interest
180. See Inmate Locator, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/iloc2/Locateinmatejsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (enter first and last name, for
example "Theodore Kaczynski," "Zacarias Moussaoui," "Terry Nichols," "Richard Reid," "Eric
Rudolph").
181. USP Florence ADMAX, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS,
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/flm/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 12, 2012).
182. Michael Taylor, The Last Worst Place: The Isolation at Colorado's ADX Prison is Brutal
Beyond Compare. So Are the Inmates, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 28, 1998, at A3.
183. Id.
184. Chris Francescani, Emily Unger & Kasi Carson, How to Survive a Supermax Prison, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 2, 2007), http://abcnews.go.comffheLaw/story?id=3435989&page--1.
185. CBSNews, Supermax: A Cleaner Version of Hell, CBS NEWS (June 21, 2009, 8:48 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/11/60minutes/main3357727.shtml.
186. Weekly Population Report, supra note 178.
187. Inmate Locator, supra note 181 (the "Unabomber").
188. Id. (a conspirator in the September 11, 2011 attacks).
189. Id. (a conspirator in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing).
190. Id (the "Shoe Bomber").
191. Id. (a conspirator in the Atlanta Olympic Village bombing).
192. See Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note
176, at 5 n.5.
193. Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 07-cv-02471-PAB-KMT, 2011 WL 4552540, at
*12 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011).
194. Compare Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 07-CV-02483-LTB-KLM, 2008 WL 5172363, at *1 (D.
Colo. Dec. 10, 2008) ("Plaintiff Omar Rezaq filed a federal lawsuit to address his incarceration at
the United States Penitentiary, Administrative Maximum Prison in Florence, Colorado ('ADX')....
As an inmate in the general population unit at ADX, Plaintiff claims that his freedom is severely
limited. He is confined alone to an 87.5 square foot cell for at least 23 hours per day. He eats his
meals alone in his cell, and when he is allowed recreation (usually around 2 hours per week), he
must recreate alone. For at least one two-month period, he claims that he was denied outdoor and
indoor exercise. When he is transported from his cell, he is handcuffed and shackled. Finally, the
location of Plaintiffs cell prevents him from experiencing direct sunlight." (citations omitted)), with
Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2011) (analyzing the conditions alleged by Toevs,
including " the amount of time spent in his solitary cell, the provision of solid metal cell doors with
at CSP persuasively supports a finding a liberty interest at the ADX.195
However, finding a liberty interest is only the first step in the process.' 96
Second, the ruling in Toevs-requiring meaningful reviews and
guides for future behavior-supports the finding of insufficient process
and applies to the 6,200 inmates in the federal system in the Tenth Cir-
cuit, including the men housed in the ADX.197 In other words, as a result
of Toevs the government would be required to provide the nation's most
dangerous inmates with reasons for their continued solitary confinement
and ways in which it might improve the conditions.' 9 8
The BOP and the U.S. Attorney's Office contend Toevs directly and
negatively implicates federal inmates within the Tenth Circuit. 99 Ac-
cordingly, the U.S. Attorney's Office filed a petition requesting the
Tenth Circuit to rehear Toevs en banc in order "to prevent the unneces-
sary and erroneous creation of constitutional rules that may apply to non-
parties." 2 00 The BOP recognized that because of the ADX and other fed-
eral facilities within the circuit, "many of [which] . . . subject [inmates]
to restrictive conditions of confinement," the Toevs requirement has "the
potential to impose a significant new burden on the federal Government
to the extent that the ruling requires a 'guide for future behavior' . . .
every time a prisoner's restricted status is reviewed." 20 ' The Attorney
General's Office echoed this sentiment in its motion to reconsider and
rehear the Toevs ruling, stating, "there is no other jurisdiction within
which [reworking the prison administrative segregation systems in the
court] ... carries such important national security and penological impli-
,,202cations.
The logic behind these motions is faulty.20 3 The required guidelines
for future behavior need not evolve into a contract for release from soli-
metal strips on the sides and bottom to prevent communication, and the requirement that he eat all
his meals in his cell").
195. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757.
196. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("A liberty interest having been estab-
lished, we turn to the question of what process is due an inmate whom Ohio seeks to place in
OSP.").
197. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 761; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehear-
ing En Banc, supra note 176, at 5 n.5; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petition for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
198. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759; Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehear-
ing En Banc, supra note 176, at 10; Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tion for Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
199. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition for Rehearing or
Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176, at 2.
200. Id.
201. Id
202. Appellees' Amended Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing En Banc, supra note 176,
at 15.
203. See Response to Petition for Rehearing at 14-15, Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir.
2011) (No. 10-1535).
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tary confinement.2 04 Merely providing inmates the reasons for their con-
finement should not supersede sound correctional judgment should the
inmate comply with the guidelines.20 5 In other words, compliance with
the guidelines does not become a "get out of jail free card." 2 06 The guide-
lines are not contractual or legally binding.207 Thus, in the event that
prisoners file suits demanding release from solitary confinement based
on these guidelines, courts should dismiss these suits under Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim. 208 The
Toevs panel ordered guidelines for future conduct, not contracts for re-
lease from solitary confinement.20 9
In addition to the procedural safeguards inherent in the judiciary,
prisoners face an additional burden from the Prisoner Litigation Reform
Act (PLRA).2 10 "Congress enacted the [PLRA] ... in 1996 in the wake
of a sharp rise in prisoner litigation in the federal courts. The PLRA con-
tains a variety of provisions designed to bring this litigation under con-
trol."211 One provision at the heart of the legislation is an exhaustion
clause requiring prisoners to exhaust all available remedies with prison
officials before filing suit.2 12 This added burden further prevents inmates
from suing on the basis of "breach of contract" springing from behavior-
al guidelines.2 13
C. Departure from the Deference Established by DiMarco
DiMarco imparted great judicial deference to penological expertise
within the liberty interest framework.2 14 Scholars refer to the hesitance of
204. See Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 759-60 (10th Cir. 2011); Response to Petition for Re-
hearing, supra note 203, at 14-15 ("I'm sure the court would refuse to entertain the notion that a
guide for future behavior constitutes some kind of binding contract that would mandate the worst of
the worst be released to [general population] despite there being every indication the inmate still
posed a threat.").
205. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
206. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
207. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60; Response to Petition for Rehearing, supra note 203, at 14-
15.
208. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)
("While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual
allegations, a plaintiffs obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do[.]" (first alteration in original) (citations omitted)); see also Response to Petition for Rehear-
ing, supra note 204, at 14 ("If an inmate in the future tries to misconstrue the Opinion as the Appel-
lees predict I am confident any court would recognize the arguments' lack of merit.").
209. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 759-60.
210. See Alexander v. Hawk, 159 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 1998) (citing statistics giving
rise to the PLRA).
211. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 84 (2006).
212. Id. at 84-85.
213. See id.
214. Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007) ("[A]ny
assessment must be mindful of the primary management role of prison officials who should be free
from second-guessing or micro-management from the federal courts.").
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the courts to interfere with penological matters as the "hands-off doc-
trine." 2 15 Some scholars argue the hands-off doctrine stopped in the
1960s and 1970s--ostensibly with the Supreme Court's decision in Wolff
v. McDonnell:216 "[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional
protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." 2 17 Oth-
ers believe the doctrine still influences courts.218 Some even argue "rigid
due process requirements eviscerate prison officials' ability to segregate
prisoners for administrative reasons in an era when prison gangs pose an
increasing threat to institutional security." 2 19
The panel decision from DiMarco serves as evidence for the schol-
ars who believe the hands-off doctrine still applies. 22 0 Recall that the
DiMarco panel injected legitimate penological interest into the determi-
215. See, e.g., David M. Adlerstein, In Need of Correction: The "Iron Triangle" of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1684 (2001) ("Traditionally, the federal judiciary
was reluctant to address prisoner grievances because of concerns involving the separation of powers
doctrine, its lack of expertise in penology, and the possibility that judicial intervention might under-
mine prison discipline. This 'hands off' doctrine, long prevalent, eroded in the face of the social
ferment of the 1960s and 1970s. Armed with 42 U.S.C. 1983 (Section 1983), prisoners aired a host
of claims in federal court, and succeeded in obtaining some meaningful reforms. Yet litigation came
at a cost-states grew resentful of perceived federal micromanagement, and the federal docket
became increasingly choked with noncognizable or frivolous prisoner claims." (footnotes omitted));
Melissa Rivero, Melting in the Hands of the Court: M&M's, Art, and a Prisoner's Right to Freedom
of Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 811, 817-18 (2008) ("The hands-off doctrine embodied the
Court's unwillingness to review prison administrators' decisions. Under the doctrine, federal courts
avoided addressing whether prisoners retained any constitutional rights. The primary function of the
courts was to ensure the freedom of illegally confined individuals, not to 'superintend the treatment
and discipline of prisoners.' Although the Court acknowledged some claims of racial discrimination
and unsafe prison conditions as egregious, the hands-off doctrine prevented the Court from address-
ing these claims. Because the Court believes prison administrators are better suited to make prison
regulations, it avoided any judicial interference in prison administrative decisions. Prison administra-
tors have to deal with inmates on a daily basis. Thus, there is a fear that judicial review may threaten
prison officials' authority." (footnotes omitted)).
216. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
217. Id. at 555-56.
218. Barbara Belbot, Where Can a Prisoner Find a Liberty Interest These Days? The Pains of
Imprisonment Escalate, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) ("The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Sandin v. Conner is testimony to the proposition that the 'hands-off doctrine never completely
expired." (footnote omitted)).
219. Theis, supra note 23, at 149; see also id. at 175 ("Prison administrators are charged with
one of the hardest jobs in our country. Limiting their ability to run prisons as they see fit is clearly
contrary to public policy. They have the task of overseeing entire populations of people who have
been convicted of felonies, some of whom will never return to public society because their crimes
were so egregious. As diverse as the crimes that brought the inmates to prison, so too are their per-
sonalities: some shrewd, some aggressive, some remorseful, and some incorrigible. The Supreme
Court's holding in Wilkinson v. Austin validates what should have been the obvious: prison officials
who oversee the day-to-day administration and procedures of specific, unique prisons are the best
situated and the best informed to make decisions that implicate the lives of prison staff and in-
mates.").
220. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 (1995) ("We have repeatedly said both that prison officials
have broad administrative and discretionary authority over the institutions they manage and that
lawfully incarcerated persons retain only a narrow range of protected liberty interests."); DiMarco,
473 F.3d at 1342 ("[A]ny assessment must be mindful of the primary management role of prison
officials who should be free from second-guessing or micro-management from the federal courts.").
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nation of a prisoner's liberty interest, which augmented the impact of
penological interest beyond the sufficiency of the process analysis, its
traditional realm. 22 ' The Supreme Court in Wilkinson specifically reject-
ed injecting penological interest into the liberty interest determination.222
Despite this directive from the Supreme Court, district courts within the
Tenth Circuit, prior to Toevs, applied the DiMarco "legitimate
penological interest" factor to situations analogous to the confinement
conditions and review procedures at CSP. 22 3 Of the three courts applying
the factor in summary judgment rulings or appellate reviews, all three
found a legitimate penological interest.224 Even in the four motion-to-
dismiss-rulings-with legal standards favorable to the plaintiff225-the
courts evenly split on this issue of penological interest.2 26
The Toevs court afforded the DOC less deference than previous
courts in two specific ways. First, the Toevs court found indefiniteness of
Mr. Toevs's confinement determinative in finding a liberty interest.227
Despite finding the government possessed an interest in keeping Mr.
Toevs in solitary confinement, the court found that his indefinite con-
finement overrode this deference. 22 8 In effect, the Toevs court shifted the
weight of penological interest back into the more appropriate analysis-
sufficiency of process or the outcome of the process-and out of the lib-
229erty interest determination.
Second, the Toevs court afforded the DOC less deference than pre-
vious courts by finding the government's reviews insufficient to pass
221. DiMarco, 473 F.3d at 1342 ("Relevant factors might include whether ... the segregation
relates to and furthers a legitimate penological interest, such as safety or rehabilitation . . . .").
222. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("OSP's harsh conditions may well be
necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose both to prison officials
and to other prisoners. That necessity, however, does not diminish our conclusion that the conditions
give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
223. See, e.g., Saleh v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 05-cv-02467-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL
5464294, at *4-6 (D. Colo. Dec. 29, 2010) (analyzing the confinement at ADX).
224. Schmitt v. Rice, 421 F. App'x 858, 862 (10th Cir. 2011); Saleh, 2010 WL 5464294, at *4;
see also Thompson v. Rios, 07-CV-00025-PAB-KLM, 2010 WL 749859, at *1 (D. Colo. Mar. 2,
2010) (accepting judgment of magistrate judge founding no penological interest).
225. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also 5B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004) ("A proposition that is at the heart of the application of
the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and one that is of universal acceptance, . . . is that for purposes of the
motion to dismiss, (1) the complaint is construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, (2) its
allegations are taken as true, and (3) all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the pleading
are drawn in favor of the pleader.").
226. See Stine v. Lappin, No. 07-cv-01839-WYD-KLM, 2009 WL 103659, at *9 (D. Colo. Jan.
14, 2009); Rezaq v. Nalley, No. 07-cv-02483-LTB-KLM, 2008 WL 5172363, at *8 (D. Colo. Dec.
10, 2008). Contra Matthews v. Wiley, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1171 (D. Colo. 2010); Powell v.
Wilner, No. 06-cv-00545-WYD-MEH, 2009 WL 840756, at *14 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2009).
227. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2011).
228. See id at 761.
229. See id. at 759-60; accord Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) ("OSP's harsh
conditions may well be necessary and appropriate in light of the danger that high-risk inmates pose
both to prison officials and to other prisoners. That necessity, however, does not diminish our con-
clusion that the conditions give rise to a liberty interest in their avoidance." (citation omitted)).
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constitutional muster. 230 DiMarco muddied the waters by placing gov-
ernment interest in the liberty interest determination.23 1 While the Su-
preme Court in Hewitt, Sandin, and Wilkinson all encouraged deference
to prison officials in the sufficiency of process determination, 23 2 Hewitt
stressed that "administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for
indefinite confinement. Prison officials must engage in some sort ofpe-
riodic review of the confinement of such inmates."233 The Toevs court in
effect equated meaningless process with no process, which functionally
makes more sense than allowing literally any form of review to count
towards the second due process prong.234 By ordering prison officials to
explain the reasons and guidelines for future conduct for continued soli-
tary confinement, the Toevs court inserted judicial influence into
235penological matters. Increased judicial attention to prisoner matters
comports with the judiciary's "duty to protect the unpopular from irra-
tional persecution and to defend the rights of the marginalized." 2 36 As
one scholar notes, "despite being on the fringe of societal acceptance,
inmates do not check all of their constitutional rights at the prison
door."237 However, without judicial attention provided by the Toevs pan-
el, prisoners' rights remain in jeopardy.
IV. CONCLUSION
Solitary confinement is a dangerous penological tool because it
takes such a serious toll on inmates' mental health. Many American hu-
man rights organizations argue against the use of solitary confinement.
American allies abroad consider solitary confinement inhumane. Never-
theless, when inmates use the judicial system to challenge the inhumani-
ty, they face serious procedural hurdles. Before Toevs v. Reid, proving
that solitary confinement created a liberty interest or that behavioral re-
views failed constitutional muster were just two of many such hurdles.
Toevs, though, clarified due process law in the Tenth Circuit. Because
230. Toevs, 646 F.3d at 760.
231. See Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334, 1342 (10th Cir. 2007). But
see Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224.
232. Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 228 ("[Clourts must give substantial deference to prison manage-
ment decisions before mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards when
correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior."); Sandin v. Con-
ner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) ("[Fjederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility
to state officials trying to manage a volatile environment."); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472
(1983) ("Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and
execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and
discipline and to maintain institutional security."), abrogated in part on other grounds by Sandin,
515 U.S. at 483.
233. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9 (emphasis added).
234. See Toevs, 646 F.3d at 757-60.
235. See id at 759-60.
236. Maximilienne Bishop, Supermax Prisons: Increasing Security or Permitting Persecu-
tion?, 47 ARIZ. L. REv. 461, 462 (2005).
237. Id.
238. See id.
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the ruling from Toevs clarified the term "indefiniteness" in a way unfa-
vorable to prisons, it implicates the due process procedures for the infa-
mous prisoners held at the ADX. Furthermore, Toevs tactfully shifts ju-
dicial deference to prison officials out of the liberty interest determina-
tion and back into the sufficiency of process analysis, its proper sphere.
Despite the fact that Mr. Toevs's appeal lost at the Tenth Circuit, the
holding nevertheless helps future prisoners' due process claims against
prison officials.
Not surprisingly, the Colorado Attorney General's Office and the
U.S. Department of Justice contest the ruling. However, the ruling in
Toevs improves due process jurisprudence by clarifying the legal stand-
ard and better protecting thousands of inmates across the Tenth Circuit.
Although requiring prison officials to conduct more meaningful reviews
seems onerous, the reviews provide guidelines for prisoner conduct, not
contracts for release from solitary confinement. Moreover, by removing
some judicial deference from the due process analysis, inmates receive
more reliable and fairer reviews. As a result, the Tenth Circuit should
deny the Attorney General's motions to reconsider and rehear en banc
and let Toevs stand.
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